Y o u n g people in C h ile have seen a sh arp increase in th e ir p articip atio n and th eir chances o f involvem en t in the social roles shaped during th e postw ar period o f expan sion . T h e rapid urbanization, th e g reat exp an sion o f education system s, the ex ten sio n o f th e political rights o f citizen sh ip , and th e grow ing absorp tion o f skilled and unskilled m anpow er by th e m od ern production and services sectors w ere som e o f th e factors w hich m obilized young people and turned th em into som e o f th e m ost com m itted agents o f d evelo p m ent and m od ernization; since d evelop m ent and m od ernization w ere also the axes o f consensus am on g alm ost all the social and political p ro tago n ists, youth becam e, alm o st inadvertently, on e o f the cen tral ag ents in the system . O n e o f th e m ost g rap h ic instances o f this was the rem arkable political and cultural influence exercised by the stud ent m ovem ents tow ards th e end o f the 1960s.
Y o u n g people in C h ile have seen a sh arp increase in th e ir p articip atio n and th eir chances o f involvem en t in the social roles shaped during th e postw ar period o f expan sion . T h e rapid urbanization, th e g reat exp an sion o f education system s, the ex ten sio n o f th e political rights o f citizen sh ip , and th e grow ing absorp tion o f skilled and unskilled m anpow er by th e m od ern production and services sectors w ere som e o f th e factors w hich m obilized young people and turned th em into som e o f th e m ost com m itted agents o f d evelo p m ent and m od ernization; since d evelop m ent and m od ernization w ere also the axes o f consensus am on g alm ost all the social and political p ro tago n ists, youth becam e, alm o st inadvertently, on e o f the cen tral ag ents in the system . O n e o f th e m ost g rap h ic instances o f this was the rem arkable political and cultural influence exercised by the stud ent m ovem ents tow ards th e end o f the 1960s.
H ow ever, a new p h en o m en on has em erged in C h ile's so cia l d e v e lo p m e n t in th e p a st decade -so cia l exclu sion , w hich affects the stru cture o f society itself, and thus all the social categories and agents, but w hose deepest and broad est effects are probably on youth. "E x clu sio n " m eans the process o f stru ctural ch ange by w hich various social groups w hich in th e im m ediate past had occupied stable institutionalized p o sition s in the social system , or could have firm exp ectation s o f places in it, have been dism issed from these p o sition s or find their access to them p ersistently blocked.
F or th is very reason youth was on e o f the m ain victim s o f the crisis, red efin ition and d isto rtio n of the m od ernization processes; it can be said that in the p ast decade this exclu sion has affected C hilean young peop le alm ost to the sam e ex ten t th at they had attained cen tral p o sition s in th e system in the tw o previous decades.
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Crisis of growth and economic participation
Young people in Chile today represent an extensive social sector with a high level of education -almost three times higher than the average level of their parents' generation-and with already remote migratory antecedents; they would seem to be in the optimum position to take charge of the complex tasks required by urban life, social modernization and political and economic development. In fact, one of the main goals of the expansion of the school system over the past quarter of a century was to involve youth in the development process.
It cannot be denied that the education system'" showed rem arkable efficiency in absorbing the whole of the young generation, leaving many elitist barriers in its wake. The latest census figures show clearly the decline in the rates of economic participation by young people due to the expansion of education: the labour supply of young people aged 15 to 19 fell nationally from 42.2 % in I9 6 0 to 30.7 % in 1970, and it fell in absolute terms as well. This drop was sharpest in the urban areas (from 38.8% to 2 7 .2 % ), the very areas which benefited most from the growth in education; and it was much sharper for men, whose rate fell from 6 1.7 % to 45 .3 % over the period. Employment of young people aged 20 to 24 also declined between these dates, although certainly to a lesser extent. In this case the drop in the rate of participation was found only in the urban areas and again mainly among men (who benefitted most from the expansion of higher-education opportunities).
However, for education to have been able to discharge effectively the role assigned to it, there would have to have been, in step with the expansion of schooling, a comparable expansion of the modern sectors of production, trade and services, which were the ones expected to absorb the better-qualified labour. W hen this did not happen, there was a resumption of the declining trend in the proportion of youth in the labour force. In fact, the projections indicated that the proportion of young people aged 14 to 19 was to I continue declining in the coming decades as a result of the extension of schooling, while the proportion of active persons in the 20-24 age group was to increase only as a result of a larger entry of women into the labour markets. But, despite the expansion of education, the pressure of young people on the labour markets did not decline by the expected amounts.
Several studies have referred to the irregularity of Chile's economic growth as an explanation of the behaviour of the rate of participation. Cáceres (1981) pointed out for exam ple that the economic activity of the 15-19 age group fell sharply in the years of greatest expansion of education (1 9 6 8 -1 9 7 3 ), but then increased during the acute recession of 1975-1976. Rosales (1979) had earlier studied the cyclical trend in the rate of secondary participation of women, discovering that women's participation in the bottom strata fell during the 1975 crisis (especially in the over-20 and under-45 age groups), while in the top strata this participation reached its lowest level for the whole of the period studied . This fact also helps to explain why the expected increase in women's participation has not occurred, at least not so far.
This thesis em phasizes the cyclical behaviour of the work participation of the secondary labour force: in conditions of eco n o m ic crisis (w ith high levels of unemployment and a decline in personal The main point about the change in the trends over the past decade is the clear relative decline in young people who do not attend school and are inactive, which indicates an accelerated incorporation in activity (usually not accompanied by effective employment). W hen the effective distribution of young people by activity and attendance in 1980 is compared with the distribution which would have been produced if the trends of the previous decade had been maintained, it can be concluded, firstly, that the ''real'' decline in inactivity is the most im portant change that has occurred, and that it can be estimated at 212 800 persons. Secondly, that the increase in attendance is noticeably slower than the increase in activity. Thirdly, that two-thirds of the additional increase in attendance is attributable to the increase in the group of a ctiv e attenders, and finally that twothirds of the reduction in the group of inactive persons who do not attend school is attributable to their assumption of activity without school attendance (table 2) .
These characteristics are typical of periods of economic crisis, when there is a mass assum ption of activity by the so-called "secondary labour force". In this case the group which provides the most newly active persons is made up mainly of women aged 15 to 19 from the lowest educational levels. However, there is also some doubt about the truly "secondary" nature of this young labour force. The year of reference (1980) cannot be considered typical of a short-term recession: on the contrary, according to official estimates, in the period 1976-1980 the product grew at rates above or close to 8% a year, and only two years later a sharp recessionary cycle began. There is much more justification for a hypothesis which associates such trends with a style o f g row th which, even in its best moments, maintained unemployment at double the historical rates and the real wages of the employed labour force at significantly lower levels than those of the previous decade. Since for a long time heads of household have been faced with unemployment or low wages, a reversal has begun in the downward trend of the participation rates, starting with the "weakest link" in the household: those members whose assumption of activity means lower short-and long-term costs ("inactive/not attending"). This assumption of activity can undergo small or even substantial changes in step with economic cycles, but it is determined mainly by the general economic framework in which these changes occur and, in particular, by the perm anent level of opportunities of work and income which this framework offers the heads of households of the less-favoured strata of society. 
II Occupational exclusion
The greatest inconsistency of the promise of modernization has occurred, without doubt, in the area of employment. The conjunction of an increasing incorporation of youth groups in econom ic activity (despite the continued expansion of education) with the inability of the economy to generate, and even maintain, certain historical levels of employment produced a phenomenon of acute occupational exclusion which had a particularly severe effect on the new g e n e ra tio n s . W aged or estab lish ed job opportunities declined sharply, as did the proportion and number of young people who managed to find work. Exclusion is different from occupational "marginality" as described in the 1960s: marginality has a very different starting point, for it generally concerns migrants from the countryside with little schooling who have not become integrated in the urban world. The term "exclusion" refers, in contrast, to the state of occupational marginality which affects a large contingent of population which formerly had access to established urban jobs, or was acquiring such access, and m oreover was mobilized socially and culturally in that direction. It thus describes the process of reversal both in the employment structure in the past decade and in the processes of social integration which had begun earlier. Exclusion must also be distinguished from mere s ta tis tic a l u n em p lo y m en t. O ccu p ation al exclusion does not arise exclusively either from changes in the labour supply (demographic pressure or incorporation of the secondary labour force in periods of crisis) or from conditions of recession, although both these factors must be taken into account. It has its origin in changes in the structure of employment (in d u stria l c ris is , red u ctio n of public employment, etc.) and, therefore, in the patterns of development which reduce and impair the economy's capacity to generate established jobs: it is a question of the structural processes which establish and increase the mass of unemployed, underemployed and poor urban dwellers.
The origin of the occupational exclusion of young people lies mainly in the decline in manual work, in particular in manufacturing industry. In the past decade the contribution of industry to the product and to employment fell visibly as a result of the policies of external openness and liberalization of the labour market. There was a collapse in the support of the former processes of modernization and the exports-substitution industry based on State backing and p ro te c tio n , w ith alarm in g consequences for employment.
This situation can be seen in table 3. The prop ortion of workers -waged manual Source: Martinez and León, (1984) .
workers-fell sharply throughout the decade: at the beginning of the decade some 4 0 % of employed young people were manual workers. In 1980 only one-quarter of them were still manual workers, and that proportion declined even m ore in the subsequent years of crisis. The proportion of manual workers in the total of occupied persons had thus taken a dizzying plunge. The decline in manual work was especially significant in the productive sectors (industry, construction, transport and mining). At the end of the decade the number of young manual workers in productive sectors had fallen to half of the figure for the decade's beginning (barely 15% of employed persons in 1980, as against 2 7% in 1971). At the same time there was a change in the internal composition of manual employment: it became tertiarized and this meant deteriorations in working conditions, income levels, stability and the opportunities for young people to join trade unions. Moreover, the reduction in productive manual employment was concentrated in manufacturing industry. W hereas earlier manual employment was basically industrial (about 60% of manual workers were in industry), the proportion of industrial workers in manual employment at the end of the decade had fallen to below 4 0 % . Lastly, the numerical superiority of young manual workers also disappeared, especially in the productive sectors; there occurred an ageing of the working population, an unmistakable sign of the difficulties encountered by young people in finding work in this sector. Additional inform ation about these processes is given in table 4, which indicates the numbers and participation of manual workers in the young non-agricultural economically active population. These data show in greater detail the magnitude of the reduction in productive manual jobs and the influence of the industrial depression on that reduction.
As we see, industrial manual workers accounted for 24% of the young non-agricultural E A P in 1971 (approximately 140 0 0 0 young workers in industry). In 1980 this proportion had fallen to only 9.5% (some 75 000 industrial workers). These declines occurred in traditional Source: Martínez and León (1984) , on the basis of IN E figures.
industry (foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco, textiles, clothing, etc.) and, above all, in modern su b stitu tio n industry (tim b e r, ch em ical products, rubber and plastic, cement, etc.). In both sectors young manual workers were found in industry. Manual jobs were maintained only in strategic industries and mining, but in both they represented a very insignificant proportion of th e young p ro le ta ria t. T h e crisis was concentrated in the substitution industry, which in the space of a decade shed some 65 000 jobs previously held by young people. There were also declines in the sectors of construction (despite the fact that at the end of the decade this sector experienced a favourable period) and tran sp ort, which together represented a reduction of approximately 15 000 productive jobs. The expansion of manual activities in the tertiary sector does not succeed in countering the sharp decline in industrial employment. The increases in manual workers in trade and services and in the crafts are insufficient to compensate for the decline in productive manual jobs. Manual workers in the non-productive sectors increase their share in young nonagricultural E A P from 11.7% to 13.9% , while craftsmen decline from 4 .7 % to 4 .1 % between the beginning and end of the decade. Craft jobs, m oreover, had always been occupied mainly by adults, owing to the skills and capital required; they therefore represent a very difficult employment alternative for young people excluded from industry.
The crisis in manual employment had a clear effect on the increase in "excluded" young people -defined as those who rem ain unemployed, or in government minimum employment programmes, or in domestic service, or own-account workers in marginal trade and services. These doubled their share in young non-agricultural E A P from 23.3% to 45 .5 % between 1971 and 1980 -an absolute increase of 230 000 young people. The decade of the 1970s closed, in fact, with 363 000 excluded young people, and it had begun with only 134 400.
First among the traditional categories of o c c u p a tio n a l m a r g in a lity is d o m e s tic employment, which has tended to stabilize in the past decade: its relative weight is maintained at approximately 11 % of the young E A P , although in absolute terms this means an increase of almost 23 000 persons.
Here it is important to note the development of domestic employment, which historically had shown a sustained reduction in its share of the young E A P . The figures of the University of Chile indicate that between I960 and 1970 domestic service declined from 27.9% to 21.9% in the 15-19 age group and from 20.2% to 15% in the 20-24 age group. In the past decade, in contrast, the proportion of domestic servants practically stabilized itself, with rates of 20.7% and 13.2% respectively in the two age groups. A study by Heskia (1980) calculates the proportion of domestic employment in the employed young E A P for the period 1957-1979. According to her figures, throughout this period female domestic servants accounted for an average of 26% of female jobs in the 14-19 age group and approximately 15% in the 20-25 age group. Heskia's series indicates a decline (not always continuous) in the proportion of female domestic servants in the two groups, which reaches its lowest point in 1974 with proportions of 13.1% and 4 .7% respectively, and then climbs from the 1975 crisis to reach, in the remaining years, the level of the historical average indicated above. Rosales reaches a similar conclusion.
The reduction in domestic employment has been explained by a decline in work activity on the part of young women and by the extension of schooling and the higher level of education which these women enjoy. As has been pointed out, the crisis pushes up the rate of participation of young women from the low strata, who again e n te r d o m e s tic s e rv ic e . T h e lack of diversification of female employment in these strata -accentuated by the reduction in the proportion of female manual workers, also detected by Rosales-feeds this trend in female employment.
W ith respect to the remaining categories of occupational marginality, mention must be made of the increase in "marginal traders" who grow from 2.3% to 3.1% in the period (more than 10 000 young people engage in this activity). The proliferation of street traders is a characteristic of the em ploym ent crisis, especially in the big towns. Much more im portant, however, is the institution of the PEM (Program a de Em pleo Mínimo -Minimum E m ploym ent P ro g ram m e) which covered almost 50 000 young people in 1980 and accounted for 12.9% of the young EA P. The PEM was set up during the 1975 crisis as a way of absorbing the effects of the generalized u n e m p lo y m e n t. T h e p r o g r a m m e w as maintained after the crisis, however, fluctuating between 120 000 and 180 000 persons (until it was again expanded in the present recession) and it took in an increasing number of jobless young people and women. In 1980 young people made up 54 .9 % of the programme.
In all marginal jobs at present account for less than half of occupational exclusion. W hereas in 1971 one-third of excluded persons were unemployed, in 1980 unemployment affected some 53.4% of them. In the past decade the number of unemployed has tripled: from 48 100 to 193 800 young people, and from 8.3% to 2 4 .3 % of the young EA P (table 5) . Open unemployment has thus been the predominant form taken by the jobs crisis in these years.
In the last quarter of a century the development of this phenomenon has been fairly clear. T h re e ph ases are usually distinguished. The phase of the 1960s was characterized by relatively low unemployment rates; the period 1970-1973 was marked by large-scale jobs policies which brought unemployment down to its historically lowest levels; and the last phase produced an explosive increase in unemployment, even outstripping the periods of recession. The evolution of employment among young people follows this same trajectory, as can be seen from the graph, in accordance with the unemployment series for Greater Santiago produced by the University of Chile.
According to these data, unemployment shows an average of 36.7% in the 14-19 age group and 23 .2 % in the 20-24 age group in the period 1974-1982, thus doubling the historical av erag es reg istered in p reviou s years. Unemployment increases sharply in times of crisis, but it has never truly decreased; even in periods of econom ic "p ro sp erity " open unemployment stayed at about 25 % of the young labour force (always, of course, with different rates according to age). Even when the periods of crisis are not taken into account, some 200 000 young people regularly remained out of work in those years.
These trends find their culmination in the recession currently affecting the Chilean The crisis causes a great reduction in the number of manual workers in productive sectors; among young people there is a spectacular reduction of 4 0 .7 % (among adults it is 2 9 .9 % ). In this case, the crisis affects manual e m p lo y m e n t in m an u factu rin g industry (including the strategic sectors), .which is reduced to an insignificant level (5.6% of the total EA P, i.e., 45 000 young people), manual employment in construction (which in 1982 is only 1.6% of the EAP, i.e., 13 000 young people), and manual employment in transport and mining. The productive sectors shed more than 50 0 0 0 young manual workers (one half of total redundancies) and these sectors account for only 9 .2% of the young EAP. Manual workers in non productive sectors and craftsmen also show declines, although not as pronounced as the previous ones, which confirms that the crisis severely depresses the "re a r' sector of the economy.
It is obvious that the crisis exacerbates exclusion. H ere too the predominant form of exclusion is open unemployment (which affects almost 6 0 % of the excluded young people and accounts for one half of total exclusion). Youth unemployment increases from 193 800 to 288 600 (i.e., from 24.3% in 1980 to 35.1% in 1982). However, on this occasion unem ployment also has a serious effect on adults: in the over-24 EA P unemployment increases from 184 600 to 4 3 0 500 (from 8 to 18.2% between these years), and the participation of young people also declines (from 51.2% to 4 0 .1 % ). This means that, in real terms, the crisis has affected the adult world more severely. The magnitude of adult unemployment at a time when the PEM was absorbing large numbers of young people and women prompted the estab lish m en t of the P O JH (P ro g ra m a Ocupacional para Jefes de Hogar -Work Program m e for Heads of Household-which , 1960-1982 Source: Employment and unemployment survey by the University of Chile (June of each year). It can thus be said, in general terms, that the evolution of employment among young people has followed a sharp incline: during the 1960s the expansion of schooling was accompanied by occupational mobility expressed notably in the reduction of the "excluded", i.e., in low unemployment rates and a reduction in marginal jobs, as well as in the vitality of manual employment and the expansion of middle-range waged employment. Social modernization based on industry and the State collapsed in the following decade; this was brought about by the demographic pressure of youth groups on the work markets, by the slowdown in the decline in the participation rates (despite the increase in the supply of education) and, above all, by the marked process of de-industrialization. All these factors, operating in acute recessions, applied the brakes sharply to the modernization process. Exclusion subsequently increased, especially in the form of open unem ploym ent and underemployment, but also in the interruption in the decline of marginal jobs; the employment of young people was confined essentially to a segment which had managed to complete its schooling, and som etim es obtain higher education and could secure m iddle-range employment in the tertiary sector. This sector is probably the only area in which there are still some traces of the modernization process which enthused Chilean society a quarter of a century ago. The present crisis is the culmination of this process of exclusion and it has affected young Chileans in particular.
in
Other dimensions of exclusion Employment problems are not the only manifestation of exclusion. Mention must also be made in this connection of the processes which have affected the working-class family and of the exclusion from housing experienced by young people from that class. Observations made on the basis of a recent survey (Valenzuela, 1984) indicate that the nuclearization of the working-class family has come to a standstill or gone into reverse; extended families are reappearing and the size of households is increasing, because young people cannot set up independent households (table 6 ). These observations indicate in fact that the average number of persons per household is now 6.6, as against 5.6 twenty years ago according to D ESA L figures; the proportion of extended families is in excess of 50 % of the households interviewed, and in these households the commonest arrangem ent is for married children to be accommodated in their parents' homes. In the sample, 54.2% of the young married couples live with their parents or parents-in-law, and a further 20.6% have joint occupancy (sharing accommodation but not incomes with another household).
This inability of young people to obtain their own housing and thus organize stable families stems both from the free-market policies which substantially reduced the construction of low-cost housing and from the employment crisis described above, which prevents them from securing stable incomes sufficient for the establishment of new households. The annual average of housing starts declined from 52 000 units in [1971] [1972] [1973] (in the previous five-year period it was about 40 000) to 30 000 units in 1973-1982. In addition, the proportion of housing starts in the public sector, which was formerly above 50% , declined to 19.5% in the latter period. The upward trend in housing construction was Source: Valenzuela, (1984) , interrupted in the latter years, and most building starts were in the private sector, which produced in accordance with market demands. It is estimated that the housing deficit may have increased by 300 0 0 0 units in the past decade, so that the total deficit would be in the order of 850 0 0 0 dwellings (Rodríguez, 1984) . These restrictions on access to low-cost housing explain the cohabitation of families in already precarious households. This causes enormous upsets: in general terms, family cohesion and the stability of young marriages are weakened. It has also been suggested that the housing deficit is connected with the increase in the numbers of young unmarried mothers and abortions. H owever that may be, the pressure for housing has increased strongly; it is calculated that between 135 0 0 0 and 200 000 families live in joint occupancies in Santiago, which represents a suppressed demand for building sites in the order of 4 000 to 6 000 hectares. The magnitude of the land-seizure m ovements is evidence of the size of this demand.
Exclusion from employment and exclusion from housing are classical symptoms of urban marginality. In both cases, as has been pointed out, these kinds of exclusion primarily affect young people. It is im portant to add, however, that working class youth is largely excluded from participation. The survey mentioned above indicates that some 70% of young people lack organized activities, except in sports clubs (which attract mainly men). The rate of tradeunion membership is virtually nil (1 .1 % ), as is participation in neighbourhood organizations (0 .5 % ). The organization indices for young people are held up only by their participation in religious organizations (1 1 % of young people) and in parochial groups (1 0 .8 % ) (table 7). Political and corporative participation is ruled ou t by p o litica l a u th o rita ria n ism and unemployment, and it is only partially offset by community participation through the churches, which have been one of the main refuges in the crisis. In short, the involvement of young people in the world o f social institutions is limited to the school. Apart from this, they are completely cut off from organized society and especially from the State, which -in the circumstances which we have described-seems to them to be an almost exclusively penal instrument.
IV

Differences among an excluded youth
It is sufficiently well established that age differences used not to have great importance in the lower strata of the population, given the early entry into work and marriage. But the expansion of education in recent decades began to give strength to the traditional concept of youth as "a period of transition". Paradoxically, this educational effect has led in recent years to exclusion from employment and housing, which has prolonged the "age of youth" in the lower strata. The generalized unemployment and underemployment affecting young people and the difficulties they encounter in setting up their own households are processes which delay their entry into the adult world. The notion of "youth" in this sense is also encouraged by the almost exclusively urban origins of the new generations (unlike the earlier generations of migrants) and by the exposure of young people to urban mass culture. The expansion of education, the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f s e c u r i n g e c o n o m ic independence and a separate home, the urban origins and the numbers and concentration of young people in the same situation are all factors which gather excluded young people into a separate social group within the world or urban marginality.
In these conditions of exclusion and alienation urban working-class youth shows the characteristics of disordered behaviour, with little apparent cultural cohesion, which have been associated with the breakdown of standards (Valenzuela, 1984) . All the processes which contribute to the formation of marginal youth groups tend in this direction: work alienation and instability, fragmentation and breakdown of family cohesion, political exclusion and social disorganization. All the processes of exclusion from organized society (the world of social institutions) have been at the same time processes of disintegration of collective life and solidarity.
These non-organized young people show symptoms of withdrawal (drugs) and rebellion (revolt) which are consistent with a more serious breakdown of standards. In contrast, among organized young people (usually in Christian organizations) the symptoms of refuge and radical mobilization indicate the way to reduce this breakdown of standards. The symptoms of withdrawal and refuge prevail in periods of economic stability among non organized and organized young people respectively; the symptoms of rebellion and mobilization occur in periods of crisis, also for each group respectively. The first case is dominated by the many forms of reaction and defence against marginality; in the second case, possibilities arise for widespread social confrontation. In the period preceding the crisis, in fact, young people from the working-class strata exhibited two clear characteristics: the spread of the use of drugs and the emergence of grassroots working-class Catholic movements.
Drug use has been associated mainly with the search for immediate pleasure (Lailhacar, 1982) . This includes behaviour connected with e r o t i c i s m , m u s i c a n d r e c r e a t i o n .
